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The Shape of the Income Distribution and Economic Growth: 
Evidence from Swedish Labor Market Regions 
 
We analyze the association between inequality and growth across 72 labor market regions in 
Sweden 1990-2006. Highly accurate measures of growth and inequality (gini, Q3, p9075, 
p5010) are derived from population register data. The regional set-up also reduces problems 
with omitted variable bias and endogeneity found in cross country comparisons since the 
regions within a country share the same redistributive policies and institutions. The findings 
suggest that inequality between the 90
th and 75
th percentiles enhances regional growth. This 
result no longer holds when we take into account changes in commuting patterns. Although 
only suggestive, the finding is interesting in that it is consistent with the hypothesis that 
inequality enhances growth by stimulating commuting incentives. 
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1. Introduction 
A potential equity-efficiency trade-off poses a severe restriction on egalitarian policymaking, 
and it serves to explain why cross-country estimations of the inequality-growth relation have 
generated great interest among economists. To empirically establish and possibly quantify 
such links is of high policy relevance since it could improve our understanding of the costs 
and benefits of e.g. changes in the tax system and other redistributive policies. In the 1990s, 
following Kuznets (1955), several studies presented empirical evidence of negative inequality-
growth associations (e.g. Bertola 1993, Alesina and Rodrik 1994, Persson and Tabellini 1994, 
Clarke 1995), suggesting that a high level of inequality may hamper growth by increasing the 
pressure for redistributive policies. These studies were followed by others which reported 
mixed results. In a much debated study, Forbes (2000) found a positive relation between ine-
quality and growth when studying an unbalanced panel of “high quality” data from Deininger 
and Squire (1996) covering the period 1966 through 1995.
1 Barro (2000) divided his sample 
into poor and rich countries and found a negative inequality-growth relationship in the group 
of poor countries (see also Li and Zou 1998), but a positive one in rich countries, implying 
that reducing inequality is good for growth at an initial stage but that inequality enhances 
growth in developed countries. However, analyzing data from the Luxembourg Income Study 
(LIS) on 17 countries within the OECD, Brandolini and Rossi (1998) found a positive relation 
between initial inequality and growth for a selection of Anglo-Saxon countries but a negative 
relation for a selection of countries from continental Europe. Voitchovsky (2005) also used 
LIS-data and included 25 relatively wealthy countries for a period of 15 years (1980-1995), 
                                                 
1 Atkinson and Brandolini (2009) compare the Deininger and Squire data with inequality trajectories indicated 
by national sources, finding that three countries out of four display different trends depending on data source. 
Also, Hanousek et al. (2008) points out that cross country comparisons are sensitive to whether the conversion of 
GDP expressed in local currency is converted to US dollars by using one single exchange rate. Using corrected 
values, they claim the results in Forbes (2000) are no longer significantly different from zero. Roodman (2009) 
reaches a similar result when empirically analyzing the assumptions regarding the set of instrumental variables.   3
but instead emphasized the importance of looking at different parts of the income distribution. 
Higher end inequality was indicated by the ratio of incomes between the 90
th and 75
th percen-
tile, p9075, while the ratio of the 50
th and 10
th percentile, p5010, reflected lower end inequal-
ity. The hypotheses tested were that higher end inequality enhances growth whereas lower end 
inequality is harmful for growth. Empirical support was presented for both hypotheses.  
The inequality-growth estimations are plagued by several inherent problems such as en-
dogeneity, omitted unobservable variables and measurement errors, all of which are exacer-
bated by the fact that countries differ in their methodologies to collect data. In the last decade 
or so, a branch of the inequality-growth literature has focused on regional data to reduce bias 
due to omitted variables and steer clear of issues of incomparability across countries.
2 Par-
tridge (1997, 2005) explored data on US states 1960-1990 and 1960-2000 respectively, based 
on US census bureau sources, reporting a positive impact on growth of overall inequality 
(gini) as well as of the share of income falling to the third quintile, Q3. There was also a posi-
tive inequality-growth link when the two measures were used simultaneously, i.e. when the 
parameter of the gini reflected the effects of inequality in the tails of the distribution. Frank 
(2009a, 2009b) partly supported the latter finding, showing a positive association between 
growth and income shares of top deciles when exploring data on gross income in US states 
1940-1990, but Panizza (2002) did not find any evidence of a positive association between the 
gini or Q3 (or both) and growth across US states 1940-1980.
3 On a more detailed regional 
level, Fallah and Partridge (2007) used US census data to analyze US counties 1990-2000, re-
porting a positive inequality-growth link in metropolitan areas but a reverse (negative) link for 
rural areas. On European data, Perugini and Martino (2008) studied the association between 
inequality and growth across 63 regions in the UK, Italy, France and Germany for the period 
                                                 
2 In their meta-analysis, Dominics, Florax and de Groot (2008, p678) conclude that “it is particularly promising 
if attention would shift towards samples of regions within one country”. 
3 These studies are based on Statistics of Income data from the IRS. Information on income classes is used to ap-
proximate the various measures of inequality, disregarding individuals below the tax threshold.   4
1995-2004, reporting a positive relation. A similar result was found in Rodríguez-Pose and 
Tselios (2008) who analyzed 94 regions from 13 countries of the European Union 1994-2001, 
via the European Community Household Panel.
4  
The present paper analyzes the association between inequality and growth across 72 Swed-
ish labor market regions for a period of 17 years, that is, 1990 through 2006. The regional set 
up should reduce omitted variable bias as Swedish regions share very similar redistributive 
policies and institutions. Further, the data is based on population register data from Statistics 
Sweden, collected in a uniform manner across regions to reasonably ensure comparability and 
minimize measurement errors. This differs from earlier studies which are based on survey data 
on subsamples of the population. We also provide tentative estimates to explore the interplay 
between inequality, growth and changes in commuting patterns. This is done by using an al-
ternative measure of per capita earnings based on “day populations”, i.e. where earnings are 
attributed to the region where the working site is situated rather than to where the individual 
worker resides. To our knowledge, this has not previously been applied in the inequality-
growth literature. Our empirical analysis considers four inequality measures; the gini, Q3, 
p9075 and p5010, thereby covering the vast majority of alternative specifications in the exist-
ing literature. Since previous studies have shown that results tend to partly depend on the 
methods used, we employ cross-sectional OLS, pooled (panel) OLS with and without regional 
fixed effects and system GMM models.  
The theoretical motivations for a study of the inequality-growth relation across regions dif-
fer somewhat from a cross-country framework. For instance, redistributions may enhance 
growth by reducing corruption, crime, social unrest and by alleviating credit constraints to al-
                                                 
4 Outside peer-reviewed publications, Nahum (2005) found a positive inequality growth link when studying 24 
Swedish regions 1960-2000. However, the results are not straightforward to interpret since the period comprises 
a strong increase in the labour force participation among females, where the growing public sector was their ma-
jor employer. With data based on individual tax records – not collapsed into households – it is therefore likely 
that the decreases in inequality are both overstated and correlated with public sector expansion across regions, 
which is unlikely to be orthogonal to growth.    5
low for investments in human and physical capital (Alesina and Rodrik 1994, Alesina and Pe-
rotti 1996, Aghion et al. 1999, Barro 2000, Persson and Tabellini 1994). In the Swedish con-
text, political stability and security are relatively minor issues and education and health care 
are virtually free of charge and of similar quality across regions.  
If inequality influences growth across Swedish labour market regions, more likely mecha-
nisms include that it provides incentives for more effort, longer working hours, attracts high 
skilled rent seekers, stimulates risk-taking, entrepreneurship, innovation and/or technological 
advances (Bell and Freeman 2001, Galor and Tsiddon 1997, Hassler and Mora 2000, Siebert 
1998). Inequality may also hamper growth by generating unequal opportunities through family 
background factors (e.g. Björklund and Jäntti 1997, Bratsberg et al. 2007). The association be-
tween the overall inequality (gini) and growth would then reflect the net effect of the opposing 
influences. Alternatively, following Voichovsky (2005), the inequality measures p5010 and 
p9075 may more appropriately capture the influence on growth if unequal opportunities are 
primarily related to lower end inequality, and the incentive effect to higher end inequality.  
For our empirical implementation, the above discussion implies that an inequality-growth 
link across Swedish labour market regions may only stem from a subset of potential theoreti-
cal mechanisms, making it easier to interpret. However, initial inequality may reflect regional 
differences in the prevailing business structures, the bargaining power of unions, the degree of 
specialization, the presence of excess rents (emerging markets) and/or policy. To the extent 
that these “initial conditions” have a causal influence on future growth rates, they constitute 
sources of potential endogeneity. From this perspective, the analysis of Swedish labour market 
regions is promising since institutions and most redistributive policies are determined by the 
central government.
5 The differences in other initial conditions are also likely to be smaller 
than across countries, and empirically modeling the mechanisms determining economic 
                                                 
5 Hence, there is little scope for migration of low productive individuals to regions with more egalitarian policies 
(Borjas et al. 1992).   6
growth is facilitated as these should be more similar across regions than across countries. 
Moreover, inequality in the area of residence may be the most significant in shaping individ-
ual’s incentives, and any potential influence of inequality on growth should be exacerbated by 
that factor flows across regions in a country are subject to only a minimum of barriers such as 
language, information or legislative restrictions. 
The contribution of the present study is to use data of exceptional quality to analyze if and 
how inequality influences growth across regions with very similar institutions. Sweden is in 
this respect an interesting object of study since it is a highly egalitarian country. Any credibly 
detected inequality-growth link is therefore likely to hold in many other developed countries, 
unless it appears specifically associated with the egalitarian institutions. Our most stable re-
sults indicate a positive link between p9075 and growth, but we also find that a key mecha-
nism behind the results is changes in commuting patterns. It implies that inequality enhances 
regional growth through incentives rather by attracting skilled labour (migration) or invest-
ments.  
The outline of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we discuss two important facts 
which possibly influence our results; the economic recession that hit Sweden in the early 
1990s and the Adult Education Initiative 1997-2002. Section 3 contains an account of our data 
and descriptive statistics. Section 4 presents our empirical approaches, while results and ro-
bustness checks are presented in Section 5. A concluding discussion is found in Section 6.   
2. The Swedish economy 1990-2006 
During the period of study, two Swedish specific facts are important to acknowledge; the eco-
nomic downturn 1990-1993 and the Adult Education Initiative (AEI) 1997-2002, which par-
ticularly in its first years attracted non-negligible proportions of employed into full-time stud-
ies. As will be further discussed in Section 5, we expected the inclusion of the period 1990-  7
1993 to have some impact on the estimated inequality-growth link, but we also found the re-
sults sensitive to the inclusion of the year 1998 or 1999. To us, the most likely explanation of 
the latter finding is the increase in the AEI during these years. In the following we discuss 
these two facts in more detail. 
Figure 1 displays the number of individuals being unemployed 1990-2006. The period 
started with an unusually deep recession which, for our purposes, is difficult to overlook. Un-
like most European countries, unemployment in Sweden remained low during the 1980s and 
was even at historically low levels between 1985 and 1990. It was followed by the worst re-
cession recorded since the 1930s, as unemployment increased from 1.8 percent in 1990 to 8.2 
percent in 1993, and the yearly GDP in Sweden decreased three years in succession from 
1990/1991. The fluctuations were related to several factors. One important issue was an exten-
sive deregulation of the credit markets in 1985 which allowed consumption to increase. High-
ly progressive tax rates, for many individuals around 80 percent on the margin, made credit 
costs low as interest rates were fully deductible. A comprehensive tax reform was imple-
mented in 1990 and 1991, where central issues were to decrease marginal tax rates and reduce 
deductions of credit costs. This led to increased credit costs, prices on real estate plummeting 
and by 1992, households had increased their savings by 12 percentage points compared with 
1988. The sudden decrease in consumption was accompanied by large cut-backs in the public 
sector, which added to the short term decline. In addition, wage increases which exceeded 
those of competing countries contributed to high inflation rates, rising in the late 1980s from 4 
percent to 10 percent, and to low real interest rates. Since the policy of the central bank was to 
maintain a fixed exchange rate of the Swedish currency, exports decreased by 10 percent al-
ready 1989-1990. The fixed exchange rate continued to weaken the competitiveness of the 
Swedish export industry until it was abandoned in October 1992.    8
A potential further complication with the period concerns the AEI, which foremost af-
fected growth temporarily in the years 1998-1999. To understand the background, one must 
appreciate that adult education at municipal education centers, Komvux, is a widely accepted 
and popular way of re-enrolment in compulsory and/or upper secondary level schooling. The 
numbers registered yearly has been relatively stable around 100,000 since the 1970s but its ef-
fects on regional earnings levels (and inequality) need not be very large as many individuals 
registered in only one course. As can be seen in Figure 1, enrolment in adult education at 
Komvux did not increase following the economic recession starting in 1991 since it tradition-
ally was not used as an active labor market program. From 1993, the government started to 
fund municipalities (but not the participating individuals) to provide seats at Komvux for un-
employed individuals. In autumn 1997, the AEI was launched. The central government then 
made the offer for interested individuals aged 25-55 to enroll in a year of full time studies at 
Komvux. Their financial support would be very generous in the form of a special grant for 
education and training, UBS, equal to the individual’s level of unemployment insurance bene-
fits.
6 The numbers enrolled at Komvux almost doubled. For our purposes, those who regis-
tered at Komvux and received the UBS may in particular have affected regional per capita 
earnings growth, as they included individuals withdrawing from productive work to instead at-
tend a year of full time studies at Komvux. The numbers with UBS in 1998 and 1999 repre-
sented roughly 3 percent of the Swedish the population aged 20-64, but with one fourth of the 
labour market regions seeing between 5 and 8 percent of the population aged 25-55 enrolled in 
the AEI. After the initial years, the numbers receiving UBS fast decreased, dropping from 
125,000 in 1998 to 35,000 in 2002. Although Komvux continued to attract rather high num-
bers, the latent demand for Komvux among employed had largely been saturated, and it plau-
                                                 
6 The AEI is described in more detail in Stenberg and Westerlund (2008).   9
sibly had less of an effect on growth as Komvux was increasingly directed towards individuals 
with a weak attachment to the labor market.   
3. Data 
This study is based on register data of the Swedish population (LISA) administered by Statis-
tics Sweden and includes records of individuals’ tax reports and of transfers from responsible 
national agencies. It has been used by The National Agency for Growth Analysis (ITPS) to 
construct measures of regional per capita labor earnings, as the sum of labor earnings in a re-
gion (including the self-employed), divided by the population and corrected for inflation (as-
sumed identical for all regions). Our measures of inequality in disposable income are gener-
ated from a subset of the regional populations each year, aged 20-64. To describe the shape of 
the income distribution, we use the gini coefficient and Q3, with the latter reflecting the me-
dian voter and/or the relative affluence of the middle class. In line with Voitchovsky (2005), 
we also employ the ratio of disposable income p9075, for upper end inequality and the ratio 
p5010 for lower end inequality. These variables, as well as the others (presented below) 
should be virtually free from measurement errors due to recall errors, rounding errors and/or 
top-coding. The regions we study have been constructed by Statistics Sweden by collapsing 
289 municipalities into 72 regional labor markets, based on commuting patterns of the labor 
force. 
An advantage with our data is the relatively large number of regions and their high degree 
of homogeneity in terms of democratic functions, public transfer systems, educational sys-
tems, labor market institutions and access to medical care. Municipal parliaments decide on 
the level of proportional taxation, which varies from around .29 to .34. The progressive part of 
the tax system is set by the government which is also responsible for redistributive transfers 
such as parental leave, unemployment insurance benefits and sick-leave and sets a norm for   10
municipalities’ social welfare payments. The government also redistributes resources from 
rich to relatively poor municipalities (“Robin Hood” taxation) to guarantee a high level of 
public service. These factors taken together should reduce omitted variable bias in regressions 
on regional growth. Potential flaws still exist, and include that the measures of disposable in-
come and labour earnings do not take into account regional differences in the size of the in-
formal sector, indirect taxations or non-cash benefits, even though these are likely to be rela-
tively similar following the above mentioned homogeneity across regions. 
An obvious disadvantage of using the per capita earnings as an indicator of regional 
growth is that it does not include surplus values of firms and other organizations. However, 
this is also an advantage for the reliability of the measure as there is no need for us to make 
indirect decompositions of surplus values to regional levels. A remaining problem is that some 
individuals work outside their region of residence (e.g. commuters). To address this concern, 
we present estimations with data on per capita earnings calculated from “day populations”, 
provided by the National Agency for Growth Analysis (1990-2005). Earnings are then attrib-
uted to the region where the main employer of an individual is located (see Section 5.5).  
Our measures of within-region inequality are based on disposable income which includes 
the sum of a large number of different incomes such as registered labor earnings, cash prop-
erty income, social retirement pensions, child allowances, benefits associated with parental 
leave, unemployment, sick-leave etc. The disposable income is expressed net of taxes and is 
constructed as the individual’s component of total family income, where the share of income 
attributed to an individual follows the formula used by Statistics Sweden.
7  
Women are included when our measures of inequality and growth are generated. There is 
no upward trend in female labor force participation during the period of study, which other-
wise would tend to compress earnings. In 1990, participation rates were 84 percent and 78 
                                                 
7 For instance, a child aged 0-3 is given the weight .42 and aged 4-10 is .52 whereas an adult member is 1.00.    11
percent for men and women respectively, which was 8 percentage points lower for both gen-
ders in 2006 (in 1990, the economic boom was at its peak). Importantly, during child rearing, 
12 months of parental leave benefits limit the fall in disposable income. They are equal to 80 
percent of the previous earnings level or a minimum transfer of about € 600 a month net of 
taxes. Most of the parental leave is used before the child is two years old (Ekberg et al. 2005).  
In Table 1, descriptive statistics of the 72 regions as recorded 1990-2006 are presented. 
Annual regional growth is on average 1.5 percent (standard deviation 3.8), but note that if one 
excludes observations prior to 1994, the average is 3.0 percent (2.2). The corresponding fig-
ures of the day population (defined above) are roughly similar. The spatial lag is constructed 
to take into account the influence on growth stemming from surrounding regions.
8 The aver-
age gini coefficient is .24 (with a standard deviation of .03) which is considerably smaller than 
the .37 (.03) for US states (Partridge 2005) or the .38 (.04) for US counties in Fallah and Par-
tridge (2007), but closer to the .29 (.05) recorded in Perugini and Martino (2008) across 63 re-
gions in Germany, France, Italy and the UK and to .28 (.05) reported in Voitchovsky (2005) 
for 21 countries.
9  
Population size across Swedish labor market regions is, of course, small compared with 
cross-country data. This could potentially make our variables more sensitive to measurement 
errors and exacerbate downward measurement error bias in our parameters of interest. The av-
erage population size of the included regions is 123,051 inhabitants (standard deviation 
287,469, median 38,221), which is slightly higher than the 81,516 in Fallah and Partridge 
(2007) for US counties (standard deviation 268,219, median not reported). Neither Perugini 
and Martino (2008) nor Rodríguez-Pose and Tselios (2008) report the population size in their 
                                                 
8 The spatial lag is a weighted average of income levels of the regions with a border to region i. The sum of the 
weights is normalized to one and is proportional to the population levels and inversely proportional to the square 
of the distance between the main cities of region i and the neighboring region.   
9 The average ratios of p9075 and p5010 in Table 1, 1.21 and 1.84, are also slightly smaller compared with 
Voitchovsky’s study, 1.33 and 2.00, and the mean of the Q3 ratio is .194 which is slightly higher than .175 in 
Partridge (2005).    12
studies of European regions. The average hides a large variation since the Stockholm commut-
ing area includes about one fourth of the Swedish labor force, and the three largest regions 
comprise about 45 percent of the labor force.  
Table A.1 in the Appendix shows descriptive statistics where the regions have been sepa-
rated into seven region types, as defined by the National Agency for Growth Analysis. These 
statistics reveal that the level of log earnings per capita is clearly higher in regions with larger 
populations. This is not surprising since one might assume that large agglomerations are asso-
ciated with a higher level of efficiency in matching and/or with greater innovative power. 
However, the average annual growth is relatively equal across different region types. For ex-
ample, the average growth rate of the region category “service producing small regions” (col-
umn to the far right) is only slightly below the rate recorded for the three big cities, despite the 
fact that this group of regions has the second lowest proportion of college graduates and the 
lowest shares in active working age. These regions also have by far the highest share of em-
ployment in farming and mining, 8.1 percent, whereas the overall average in the other regions 
is 3.5 percent. This is a potential indication of the importance of the business structure for dif-
ferences in growth rates, since regions are relatively similar in terms of policy and institu-
tions.
10  
Figures 2 and 3 display the distribution of yearly growth rates and gini coefficients for the 
period 1990-2006.
11 As expected, the variation at a particular time t is large relative to how the 
distributions change over time. Thus, in line with earlier studies, most of the variation is cross-
sectional rather than temporal (e.g. Deininger and Squire 1996, Voitchovsky 2005, Partridge 
2005). In our data, the increase in the average level of per capita earnings is about 30 percent 
over the period 1990-2006. This is almost a third less than the Swedish GDP per capita growth 
                                                 
10 By construction, the business sectors’ shares of total employment sum to one in each region. 
11 For expositional reasons, we exclude two growth outliers recorded in 2006, one negative and one positive, 
shown as max and min values in Table 1. The second largest numbers are -12.1 and 9.4, both found in Figure 2.    13
during the period, which was 43 percent. This reflects the fact that we treat each region as an 
entity, thereby attaching the weight 1/72 to each region including a growth region like the 
Stockholm-Uppsala area which comprises about one fourth of the labor force.  
The spread in the gini coefficients is markedly larger in 2006 as compared with the start of 
the period. The median gini coefficient increased from .21 in 1990 to .28 in 2006. This in-
crease in inequality has been much debated in Sweden. A number of candidate explanations 
have been suggested, including technological change, increased individual wage setting and a 
lower overall employment (e.g. Nordström Skans et al. 2006, Björklund and Freeman 2008). 
To facilitate the understanding of our regression results in Section 5, it is informative to 
explore how the inequality variables are interrelated with our other independent variables. Ta-
bles A.2 and A.3 present results from regressions where inequality, per capita earnings levels 
and per capita earnings growth are dependent variables. However, at this stage we do not ex-
plore the inequality-growth link. Table A.2 presents cross-sectional regression estimates on 
the four (standardized) inequality measures in 2006, using 1990 as the year of observations for 
the explanatory variables. The results are by and large stable to the use of other initial years 
and/or end years. The proportion of college graduates is positively related to higher inequality. 
This is consistent with the notion that an increased level of skills tends to generate inequality 
by influencing the degree of specialization. The negative influence on Q3 may reflect that the 
higher inequality partly comes at the expense of the middle class. The demographic variables 
do not show any clear patterns except that the fraction aged 30-54 is negatively associated 
with higher end inequality as measured by p9075, possibly compressing higher end earnings 
due to increased competition. The share of employment in the public sector tends to reduce the 
gini, p9075 and p5010, but to increase the Q3 ratio, presumably reflecting the compressed 
earnings structure in the public sector.    14
In Table A.3, columns (1) and (2), the data manages to explain relatively well the level of 
earnings per capita, with R
2 above .72. The explanatory power falls dramatically in columns 
(3) and (4) where growth now is the dependent variable, to R
2 levels below .15. The only vari-
able to consistently display statistical power is the proportion of college graduates. The frac-
tion aged 30-54 is associated with a higher per capita earnings levels but not with growth 
rates. The parameter associated with the lag of the per capita earnings is negative, indicating 
convergence in levels and its inclusion also tends to destabilize the parameters of the demo-
graphic variables.
12  
In columns (5) to (8), we report results from panel estimates 1990-2006, using observa-
tions every fourth year (T=5). In column (6), the proportion of college graduates is the only 
explanatory variable, and highly significant. However, as soon as we include the time specific 
effects in column (7), there is no statistically significant link between college and regional 
growth, possibly indicating that the panel structure consisting of four year intervals is a time 
frame which is too short for college to have an effect on growth. The regional framework of 
our data also means that, unlike the case of cross-country evidence, college achievement is 
less likely to capture other institutional factors correlated with educational attainment. 
4. Empirical considerations 
Empirical estimations of an inequality-growth link are typically plagued by endogeneity, omit-
ted variable bias and measurement error bias. There is little doubt that both growth and ine-
quality are endogenous variables which are partly determined by the same factors (e.g. Lund-
berg and Squire 2003, Benarjee and Duflo 2003). Many of these are difficult to appropriately 
measure and an inequality-growth regression coefficient therefore reflects an unknown mix-
                                                 
12 The regressions presented in columns (4) and (8) of Table A.3 are similar to the growth regressions analyzed 
in Section 5, except that the inequality measures are omitted from the equation.   15
ture of factors such as e.g. the level of corruption, the quality of democratic functions, credit 
markets, health care systems and educational systems. Thus, the omitted variable bias is close-
ly related to the endogeneity issue but in the case of Swedish regions, the factors mentioned 
are to a large extent evened out and the considerable room for interpretation is narrowed 
down, improving our possibilities of correctly interpreting the results. Measurement errors can 
never be completely neglected but, as discussed in the previous section, they are likely to be 
relatively small in our data.  
In the empirical analysis, we estimate growth models where we consider a region i at time 
t, which has per capita earnings level  it y and a growth per time period  
it t i it it it it G X y y ε θ γ λ β α + + + + + = ∆ − − − 1 1 1     [ 1 ]  
where () 1 − − = ∆ it it it y y y and the vector 1 − it X include controls for business structures, demo-
graphic variables, educational attainment and a spatial lag which takes into account the influ-
ence of neighboring regions on growth in region i. Further, 1 − it G is a measure of inequality in 
region i at time t-1 whereas t θ and i γ are time- and regional fixed effects respectively. Our four 
measures of inequality; gini, Q3, p9075 and p5010, will be used in separate regressions. In ad-
dition, gini will be combined with the Q3 ratio to check the influence of the tails of the distri-
bution and p9075 will be combined with gini primarily as a robustness check, the gini then re-
flecting inequality outside the p9075 space.  
Our first approach is to use cross sectional estimations, which only include one observa-
tion per region. The terms t θ and i γ then naturally drop out, but one may argue that as our vari-
ables of interest are relatively persistent over time, the exclusion of  i γ  comes at a relatively 
low cost. In our data, the variation within regions represents about .09 percent of the variation 
in the gini coefficient and p9075 while about .20 of the variation in Q3 and p5010.    16
Our second approach is to exploit the panel structure of the data to estimate pooled OLS 
regressions, where time specific fixed effects t θ take into account trends common to all re-
gions. With more cross-sections exploited, the number of observations increase and potentially 
also the precision of the estimates. However, a pooled OLS regression will typically overesti-
mate the parameterα in equation [1] since 1 − it y will be correlated with the regional specific ef-
fects i γ (which are then part of the error term). The coefficientsβ andλ are then also likely to 
be biased due to the correlation between the lagged dependent variable and the other explana-
tory variables. However, this bias is not necessarily a major concern.
13  
When exploring the panel structure of the data, one is also forced to choose the length of 
time between t and t-1 in regressions [1]. A neo-classical growth model framework stipulates a 
steady-state level of growth. A change in the economic environment will change the growth 
rate until a new steady state level of per capita earnings growth is reached. Thus, the growth 
rate is affected only during the convergence process which is of an unknown time length. Hy-
pothetically, a few years could be sufficient for individuals to react by altering their behavior, 
and five years is an often used interval. Classical growth models, however, tend to emphasize 
long-term effects due to fixed capital investments and relocation costs of capital and labour. 
Our approach will be a pragmatic one where we consider different time lengths to check the 
stability of the results. Given the data at hand, the longest time frame possible is to measure 
growth 1990-2006 and use 1990 as t-1. While longer or shorter time spans may also be feasi-
ble, data obviously sets a limit for us to explore longer intervals. 
A natural extension of the pooled estimates is to include the regional fixed effects 
term i γ to control for time invariant omitted variables. A drawback is then that the parameter of 
the lagged dependent variableα instead will be downward biased and, as in the pooled OLS 
                                                 
13 Judson and Owen (1999) show in one of their examples (for T=5) that this bias is less than three percent, while 
the bias in the lagged dependent variable is fifty percent.   17
model (but now in the reverse direction), bias will spill over on the other parameter estimates. 
Another property of the regional fixed effects model is that the parametersβ andλ are identi-
fied by the variation within regions (which cannot be explained by overall time-trends). Since 
cross-sectional variation is typically much larger, the limited variation left to explore may be 
too small to be informative as precision deteriorates. Put differently, fixed effects models risk 
to disregard effects on growth stemming from persistent differences in inequality, i.e. the very 
variation which we are interested in is captured by the fixed effects. In addition, the probabil-
ity of finding insignificant coefficient results is strengthened by that region specific fixed ef-
fects increases downward measurement error bias. This has been emphasized by several au-
thors, but as pointed out by Durlauf et al. (2005), it does not necessarily imply that the factors 
do not matter but rather that one cannot identify any significant effects with the available data. 
Our fourth strategy is to explicitly address the endogeneity of the right hand side variables 
by employing system GMM models (Arellano and Bover 1995, Blundell and Bond 1998). 
This approach takes regional fixed effects into account, but retains the cross-sectional infor-
mation in the data. This is accomplished by constructing a system of equations which consists 
of both a levels equation [1] and a transformed equation expressed in first differences  
it it it it it G X y y ε λ β α ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ = ∆ − − − 1 1 1                [2] 
In order to tackle endogeneity, the explanatory variables in the transformed difference eq-
uation [2] are instrumented with appropriately lagged values of  it y  and  it X whereas the ex-
planatory variables in the levels equation [1] are instrumented with lags of  1 − ∆ it y  and  1 − ∆ it X . 
In the empirical section, the Hansen J-statistic is reported to test the null hypothesis that the 
instruments are jointly valid. However, a general problem is that when the number of instru-
ments becomes large, a high predictive power in the first stage regression may create an “over-
fit” of the endogenous variable, such that one is stuck with the original endogeneity bias. An-  18
other problem is specific to the GMM technique and related to the optimal weighting matrix 
used to identify the moments between the instruments and the error terms.
14 Roodman (2009) 
demonstrates how these two issues, when the instrument count is high, may generate Hansen 
J-statistics which despite invalid instruments tend to not reject the null of joint validity. He ar-
gues that these risks are largely underestimated and that they potentially generate false-
positive results. As a demonstration of this, the results in Forbes (2000) are shown not to hold 
when some simple test procedures of the validity of the GMM model are performed. In the 
empirical analysis, we follow Roodman (2009) and check the coherence of the Hansen test 
statistics by varying the set-up of the instrumental variables. The exact procedure is explained 
in Section 5.4.  
5. Results  
The results presented in this section are first based on cross-sectional data where average an-
nual growth across 72 regions is measured over time-spans between eight and 16 years. This is 
followed in Section 5.2 by pooled OLS panel data regressions where we explore observations 
at several points in time. In Section 5.3, the model is augmented with regional fixed effects 
while Section 5.4 presents system GMM estimates. In Section 5.5, we check the sensitivity of 
our results with respect to the earnings of commuters, by attributing earnings to the regions 
where the work is located. Throughout, we run stability checks by changing the base year 
and/or the final year of regional income growth as well as the length of panel intervals. The 
system GMM estimates also include statistical tests of the model specifications.   
 
 
                                                 
14 The weighting matrix also has consequences for the estimated standard errors, which is why it is necessary to 
apply Windmeijer (2005) correction to the covariance matrix.   19
5.1 Cross sectional estimates of inequality on growth 
The analysis of a single cross section allows for a regression on long term growth rates. A nat-
ural starting point is therefore to use the longest possible inequality-growth link between the 
first and last years available, 1990 and 2006. The stability of the results is then checked by 
changing the final year of observation to 2005, 2004, 2003 etc back to 1998, and by repeating 
the procedure using 1994 as the base year. The latter is motivated by that the exceptional eco-
nomic slump in the early 1990s may affect the statistical associations between growth rates 
and explanatory variables.  
Table 2 shows coefficient estimates of the inequality-growth relation as measured be-
tween 1990 and 2006, columns (1) through (6), and between 1994 and 2006, columns (7) 
through (12). In the first six columns of Table 2, most explanatory variables have low statisti-
cal power. One exception is the proportion of college graduates whereas the only measure of 
inequality which appears related to growth is the p9075 measure (p-value of .119). However, 
the inequality-growth relation is stronger when growth is measured 1994-2006, and as one ex-
plores cross-sections with shorter time spans, the weak explanatory power for the 1990-2006 
regression is somewhat of an exception. Table A.4 in the Appendix presents results from using 
shorter cross-sections with both 1990 and 1994 as base years.
15 Studying one measure of ine-
quality at a time, the picture emerging is relatively stable for Q3 (negative) and p9075 (posi-
tive), whether we use 1990 or 1994 as the base year and as we shorten the time frame of the 
growth period to 2001, p-values are throughout below .12. When Q3 or p9075 is combined 
with the gini, the parameter estimates are less precise, but their absolute magnitudes are only 
slightly reduced. In regressions where 2000 is the final year, the coefficients of the inequality 
measures display higher p-values (about .20) and when using 1998, the year when the Adult 
                                                 
15 To save space, we then only display the estimated parameters linked with our inequality measures. Complete 
results are available on request.    20
Education Initiative was at its largest (see Section 2), they are close to zero and associated 
with p-values above .60. The weaker results are plausibly related to the AEI, or long standing 
effects of the economic slump 1990-1993, rather than a shorter time frame. Results from a re-
gression based on 1994 and 2002 (same time length) renders p-values below .030 for all ine-
quality measures, including the gini and p5010. 
If the analysis is restricted to 1994 as the base year, and employing years beyond the AEI 
to measure average annual growth, the results indicate relatively persistent statistically signifi-
cant inequality-growth relations for the gini (positive), Q3 (negative) and p9075 (positive), see 
columns (9) through (12) in Table A.4.
16 This impression is slightly altered when 1990 is the 
base year, with p9075 appearing as the least sensitive of these relationships, followed by Q3 
while the estimates of the gini are relatively imprecise. Another reservation against the results 
based on 1994 as the base year is that the proportion of college graduates has very little ex-
planatory power since the inequality measures, one by one, absorb the positive effect of col-
lege graduates on growth.
17  Without an inequality measure in the 1994 and 2002 regression, 
the estimate of the college variable is .11, p-value .002, suggesting that education is a potential 
confounding factor when we analyze the growth inequality relationship.  
The magnitude of the estimates should not be interpreted uncritically as it is reasonable to 
believe that they only partially reflect causality. However, if one accepts our estimates as up-
per bounds, it is interesting to quantify the p9075-growth relation even though it is not alto-
gether stable. Using the estimates obtained 1994-2004 indicates that a standard deviation in-
crease in p9075 increases the yearly growth rate by .131*.207 = 2.5 per cent, and a corre-
sponding calculus based on 1994-2002 generates .144*.371 = 5.3 per cent. The estimates are 
                                                 
16 The parameter of the gini, when combined with Q3, captures the effects of the tails of the distribution. It 
would potentially reveal the importance of wealth available for investments. Given that our data only encompass 
a single country, investments may be more likely to be financed by individuals residing outside a region. In addi-
tion, the tails of the disposable income distribution are not necessarily good measures of wealth.  
17 Using 1990 as the base year, the proportion of college degrees is in general highly significant.   21
very similar if 1990 is the base year and the gini estimates imply effects in a similar range. Of 
course, these numbers should not be read literally but the relatively large numbers signal the 
potential importance of improving our knowledge regarding costs and benefits associated with 
policies influencing the shape of the income distribution.  
The negative association between the Q3 ratio and economic growth is in stark contrast to 
Partridge (1997, 2005) who reported a positive Q3-growth relation across US states using a 
similar regression framework, consistent with the hypothesis that a high Q3 ratio would en-
hance growth by making increases in tax distortions less likely. The welfare of the middle 
class is often seen as a proxy of the overall state of a region, which in patterns across countries 
appears to be favorable to economic growth (e.g. Alesina and Perotti 1996). In the context of 
Swedish labor market regions, a higher share of Q3 may generate increased public spending 
since the confidence in public authorities is relatively high, possibly related to common norms 
e.g. “in favor of work” (Lindbeck 1995). This interpretation finds some support in regressions 
on the relative size of the public sector in 2006, which indicate a significant and positive rela-
tion with Q3 in 1994, but the result is not significant when the difference (1994-2006) in the 
relative public sector size is used as the dependent variable. Regarding growth, it may be that 
the larger public investments only deteriorate short-run growth, but generate higher growth in 
the long-run (Partridge 2005).  Alternatively, public investments finance common goods 
which enhance utility to compensate for lower economic growth.  
 
5.2 Panel data results 
As the cross sectional evidence above covers relatively long time frames, one might argue that 
a lot of useful information is wasted with such a set up. Table 3 displays results from panel da-
ta observations for the period 1994-2006 using every third year (columns 1-6) or every fourth 
year (columns 7-12). The explanatory power of the time specific effects (coefficients not dis-  22
played) is relatively strong, whereas the coefficient of the lagged level of income is consis-
tently negative, indicating convergence in income levels.
18 There are significant coefficients 
linked with the Q3 ratio (negative) and the p9075 (positive), whereas the gini and the p5010 
ratio again display weaker associations with growth. In terms of coefficient signs, the results 
for Q3 and p9075 are relatively stable to alternative settings of the panel data, but the preci-
sion is not. Table A.5 in the Appendix display results from 22 regressions where we use alter-
native panel set-ups, i.e. different time periods where the interval lengths are varied from three 
years to six years. The Q3 measure, when being included on its own in the growth regression, 
has a negative coefficient in 19 cases, with a p-value below .10 in seven instances. When also 
the gini is included together with the Q3 ratio, the number of negative coefficients is 20, with 
three of these statistically significant. As for the p9075, whether included on its own or to-
gether with the gini, it has a positive sign in all cases, being statistically significant in exactly 
half of the 44 regressions.    
One should perhaps not be surprised that the Q3- and p9075-growth relations are weaker 
compared with the results obtained with the cross-sectional models, as most panels include ob-
servations from the economic downturn and/or years of the AEI 1997-2000. If one avoids 
panel set-ups where years prior to 1994 are included, the parameters of the p9075 are signifi-
cant in 15 out of 20 instances, the Q3 eight times out of 20. Thus, despite the instability in 




                                                 
18 Neoclassical convergence suggests diminishing returns and that a high initial level of per capita earnings 
would decrease growth. If regions are close to their steady state levels of income, the growth paths are primarily 
affected by transitory cyclical and structural shocks, and the lagged income variable need not be included. This 
generates a tendency for larger absolute values of the parameters associated with inequality.    23
5.3 Controlling for regional fixed effects  
As mentioned previously, one problem with the cross-sectional estimates, single or pooled, is 
omitted variable bias. It means that the Q3/p9075-growth relations indicated by the panel re-
sults above may be driven by time invariant unobserved heterogeneity between regions. Table 
4 displays results from regressions where region fixed effects have been added. The inequality 
coefficients should now be interpreted as how a change in inequality is related to a change in 
growth (i.e. the second difference of per capita log earnings). Hence, the magnitude of the co-
efficients is not comparable to the ones discussed in the previous sections.
19 As expected, with 
parameters only reflecting the limited variation within regions, we find very weak inequality-
growth associations. Only when Q3 is being combined with the gini is the estimate statistically 
significant.  
In Table A.6 in the Appendix, estimates from 13 different panels are presented. We do not 
consider five and six year intervals since only the temporal variation is used for identification 
of the parameters.
20 Out of the 13 different specifications being used, the Q3-estimate has a 
negative sign in 25 out of the 26 regressions, as counted when also the gini is included, but the 
coefficients are only statistically significant in a few cases. A similar but reverse picture 
emerges for the p9075 coefficient which is positive in 25 out of the 26 estimates but with very 
low precision, only significant in three instances. Even though the sign of the estimates is rela-
tively stable, the inequality-growth relationship is statistically very weak. 
A common way to retain some cross-sectional variation is to use fixed effects for types of 
regions (e.g. Persson and Tabellini 1994, Barro 2000, Panizza 2002, Partridge 1997, 2005). In 
Table 5 and Table A.7, we present results from regressions where dummy variables control for 
                                                 
19 Barro (2000) argues that it is more relevant to study how differences in inequality affect growth rates (pooled 
OLS) rather than how changes in the inequality affect changes in growth rates (fixed effects).  
20 In this case the number of periods of observations might be too small to reach sensible identification.     24
the region types presented in Table A.1 (discussed in Section 3). The parameter estimates are 
now very close to the ones obtained with our pooled OLS approach in Section 5.2 above (Ta-
ble 3 and Table A.5). Hence, the variation across regions within region families is sufficient to 
generate these results.  
 
5.4 System GMM 
As discussed in Section 4, two attractive features of the system GMM model is that it includes 
regional specific controls, but still exploits variation across regions, and that it explicitly ad-
dresses endogeneity by using available lags as instrumental variables. However, the set-up re-
lies on strong assumptions, not least regarding the validity of the instruments. We therefore 
avoid the potentially misleading convention in the literature, to rely on a test statistic from a 
single model specification (Forbes 2000, Panizza 2002, Benarjee and Duflo 2003, Voit-
chovsky 2005), and extend the test procedure of their joint validity (explained below). As our 
point of departure, we use a panel with three year intervals 1994-2006. It leaves us with T=5 
and enables us to make straightforward tests of the model by varying the set-up of the instru-
mental variables. The number of explanatory variables is restricted to a minimum as they 
quickly increase the number of instruments and weaken the Hansen test of joint validity. Con-
sequently, we only include the proportion with a college degree together with time specific ef-
fects and the respective inequality measures. Below, we also present estimates based on four 
year intervals (T=4) in the same period 1994-2006. In our pooled regressions, both these pan-
els resulted in strong statistical associations between the Q3/p9075 and growth (Table 3). This 
is useful from the perspective that employing GMM puts high demands on variation in the 
data. 
As there is an arbitrary element to how one specifies the set of instruments, we follow 
Roodman (2009) to explore four versions. The first approach is to use all available lags as in-  25
struments.
21 We then reduce the number by either only using the first available lag and/or by 
“collapsing” the instrument set, i.e. restricting subsets of the instrumental variables to have the 
same coefficient, thereby squeezing the matrix horizontally. The estimates presented in Table 
6 are thus as follows; columns (1), all available lags are used as instrumental variables; col-
umns (2), the count of instruments is reduced through the use of a collapsed matrix; columns 
(3), only the first available lag is used; columns (4), the two strategies are combined.   
In Table 6, the parameter of the Q3 measure is unstable, but significantly negative when 
we use four year intervals combining both strategies to reduce the number of instruments (4). 
However, we also find a significantly positive Q3-growth relationship, which could question 
the previous findings. The p9075 parameter estimates are more stable in that they are always 
positive, consistent with earlier estimates, irrespective of how the GMM function is specified. 
Regarding precision, when based on three year intervals, the p-values are relatively low at 
.170 in (1) and .089 in (2). If one includes the gini among the explanatory variables, the p-
values of p9075 remain around .15 in columns (1) and (4).
 22 
However, importantly, by looking more closely at Table 6, it becomes apparent that the 
test for joint validity of the instrumental variables is not completely reliable. First, joint valid-
ity cannot be rejected by the Hansen J-statistic in column (1) (p-value .110).
23 Then, the Han-
sen test consistently rejects joint validity in columns (2) through (4), despite the fact that the 
instrument count is reduced compared with column (1). This is quite counter intuitive (but in 
                                                 
21 All available lags means the first through to the last observable lag in the case of the transformed equation, but 
only the first lags of  it y ∆ and it X ∆ for the level equation. The reason is related to the fact that for it y ∆ and  it X ∆ to 
be valid instruments, they must be uncorrelated with the region specific fixed effects (since these are in the error 
terms), and further lags would in such a case be redundant. Another requirement is that to use it y and it X as in-
struments in the transformed equation [2], it ε must not display serial correlation. An explicit test for serial corre-
lation is provided by the Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation in the residuals of the transformed equation. A 
negative AR(1) is expected since neighbouring differenced residuals share one term, but a check for AR(2) in 
differences, displayed in Table 6, is a test for AR(1) in levels. 
22 With corresponding models, Voitchovsky (2005) used .15 as threshold “significance level”. 
23 The number of instruments is 31, which in comparison is not excessive (e.g. Voitchovsky 2005, Forbes 2000). 
One factor which is not satisfactory here is that the coefficient value of the lagged dependent variable (.981) does 
not lie between the estimates obtained with pooled OLS (upward biased estimate; .962) and a regression with re-
gional fixed effect (downward biased estimate; .401).   26
line with the remarks of Roodman, 2009) and indicates that the Hansen test, or any other test 
of the structural specification, can easily be misleading when one uses a large number of in-
strumental variables. 
Estimates based on four year intervals are slightly larger in magnitude, but there is no sta-
tistically significant link between p9075 and growth, and the Hansen tests reject joint validity 
of the instrumental variables. We estimated several alternative models where 1990 was in-
cluded and/or where the explanatory variable college was left aside, and the nature of the re-
sults were throughout insignificantly different from zero (not displayed).  
To summarize this subsection, the GMM estimates imply that the relation reported earlier 
between regional growth and Q3/p9075 reflects some endogenous mechanisms.  
 
5.5 Commuters – day populations and night populations 
The estimates above are silent about the mechanisms driving the p9075-growth-link. It may 
partly work through some confounding variable(s) which influences both initial p9075 and fu-
ture growth. One candidate is amenities which may be a driving force behind migration pat-
terns, potentially independently of income distributions. Another one is related to spillover ef-
fects between regions, e.g that growth is affected by the technological progress in neighboring 
regions, by an inflow of commuting labor or, conversely, by emerging firms in neighboring 
regions, which provide job-offers. Commuting is arguably one of the largest manifestations of 
spillover effects.
 24 Thus, one way to assess their importance for the inequality-growth link is 
                                                 
24 The inclusion of the spatial lag, which captures characteristics of surrounding regions, tends to reduce the sta-
tistical power of p9075 (although it is itself non-significant throughout), indicating a relation between p9075 and 
the surrounding regions.   27
to directly ascribe the earnings of commuters to the regions where the working site is situated, 
referred to as “day populations”.
25  
To obtain the average per capita earnings of the day population, the sum of in-commuters’ 
earnings is added whereas the sum of out-commuters’ earnings are excluded. This measure of 
the per capita earnings growth is provided by the National Agency for Growth Analysis (until 
2005). To see how the two measures could be expected to differ, one may assume a region has 
an initial level of in- and out-commuting which generates a given level of per capita earnings 
of the night populations and the day populations, respectively. Assume there are emerging 
markets in neighboring regions which increase the number of out-commuters. The per capita 
earnings growth used thus far is then related to the potential increase in earnings of the com-
muter, as well as the dynamic effects on the local labor market. If out-commuters tend to be 
replaced by unemployed individuals from the region, the growth may be substantial. In con-
trast, out-commuting makes the sum of earnings of the day population fall instantly, having a 
strong negative effect on growth.
26 The fall in growth is halted to the extent that unemployed 
individuals fill the vacancies generated by commuters. To simplify, if inequality attracts com-
muters (and/or investors); one would expect a positive inequality-growth link to be strength-
ened when analyzing day-populations. On the other hand, if inequality tends to provide incen-
tives to commute, a positive inequality-growth link should be weakened.  
Table 7 presents estimates of per capita earnings growth based on day populations. The 
regressions are cross sectional and are comparable to the results in Table 2, with average an-
nual growth measured between 1990 and 2005, columns (1) to (6), and between 1994 and 
2005 in columns (7) to (12). The estimated coefficients of inequality are generally insignifi-
cantly different from zero. Moreover, going through the rather large set of alternative cross-
                                                 
25 The per capita earnings used in the preceding sections are based on the sum of earnings pertaining to “night 
populations”, i.e. earnings are ascribed to the region where an individual lives. 
26 Hypothetically, if all positions of new out-commuters are taken by unemployed individuals from the local la-
bor market, there could be no losses in per capita earnings of the day population.   28
sections and panel set-ups discussed in previous sections, the coefficients of the p9075 meas-
ure are only rarely associated with p-values below .10.
27 The results indicate that commuters 
may constitute an important mechanism behind the p9075-growth link reported above. A styl-
ized interpretation is that inequality is more discernable to individuals in the region where they 
reside. Inequality in the home region may then provide increased incentives to seek better paid 
jobs, thereby generating a higher probability of out-commuting which enhances per capita 
earnings growth of night populations (used in our earlier regressions) but not of day popula-
tions. The estimates of the other coefficients are by and large similar to those of Table 2 (dis-
cussed in Section 5.1), except that the share of employment in the public sector is negatively 
associated with growth. This negative association indicates that the public sector is not associ-
ated with in-commuting, or reversely, that the share of private sector employment is linked to 
increased in-commuting.  
The results above possibly reflect that inequality drives growth through enhanced incen-
tives for residents rather than by attracting skilled labour or investments. However, we do not 
wish to jump to conclusions and only view the above results as suggestive. Also, we certainly 
do not exclude that the inequality growth mechanisms may be different between economic en-
vironments.  
Intuitively, one would expect out-commuting to be more common in small regions. Since 
the results imply that out-commuting drive the results found in the preceding sections (based 
on night-populations), small regions may drive the positive results between p9075 and growth 
which we found earlier. We use the median population in 1990 as a threshold to divide our re-
gions into samples of small and large regions. Estimation results  (not displayed) indicate co-
efficient signs which support the hypotheses, but the issue is difficult to properly investigate 
                                                 
27 The parameter of p9075 is never significant at a 10 percent level when we use cross sections with 1990 as the base year 
(once when 1994 (-2002) is the base year), nor is it significant in pooled panel regressions with four or five year intervals, on-
ly once with six year intervals (1990-2002) and twice with three year intervals (1993-2005 and 1996-2005). The gini and Q3 
perform even worse in terms of explanatory power.    29
since we lose precision when each regression is based on 36 regions. Consequently, there is no 
support for the inverse hypotheses either, implied by the results in Fallah and Partridge (2007) 
on US counties. They found a positive link between inequality (gini) and growth in metropoli-
tan areas but a negative link in rural areas.   
6. Concluding discussion 
The results presented in this paper concern the context of a country with a highly developed 
welfare state and imply that inequality between the 90
th and the 75
th percentiles enhanced per 
capita earnings growth in the Swedish labor market during the period 1990 through 2006. It is 
interesting that the finding partly corroborates Voitchovsky (2005), which was based on cross 
country data from the Luxembourg Income Study. The recurring pattern of a positive p9075-
growth relation might be a promising path for future studies as longer time-series and data 
from other regions with other characteristics gradually become available. It would also be in-
teresting if the magnitude of the effects could be assessed, potentially indicating at least crude-
ly quantifiable costs and benefits of policies which affect the shape of the income distribution.  
We find virtually no support for an association between lower end inequality (p5010) and 
growth, but weak evidence that the proportion of incomes falling to the third quintile (Q3) is 
negatively related to regional growth. This is in contrast with Partridge (1997, 2005) who re-
ported the Q3 ratio was positively related to growth across US states 1960-2000. The negative 
relation between Q3 and growth found here indicates either that the Q3 is not a good proxy of 
the median voter behavior in Swedish regions or the behavior of the median voter is different 
from the US context. For instance, the Q3 ratio may be associated with opposing preferences 
regarding public spending, which in turn may imply different short-run effects on growth.  
Concerning overall inequality (gini coefficient), the results are very weak even though 
cross sectional estimates limited to years avoiding the economic downturn at the start of the   30
1990s, and the years of the Adult Education Initiative 1997-2000, actually render stable posi-
tive estimates. Future studies may thus be more successful in stabilizing the results as it is pos-
sible that temporary fluctuations are at the root of our otherwise diverging findings. The re-
sults are only weakly supportive of earlier evidence based on US states (Partridge 1997, 2005) 
or European regional data (Perugini and Martino 2008, Rodríguez-Pose and Tselios 2008) 
which has indicated a positive relation between overall income inequality and growth. Our 
findings are more similar to the unstable results on US states 1940-1990 in Panizza (2002), 
and on US counties in Fallah and Partridge (2007), even though they reported significant rela-
tions between the gini and growth in metropolitan areas (positive) and rural areas (negative) 
when studied separately.    31
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of 72 regions 1990-2006. 
 
N = 1,224 
 Mean Std.  Dev. Min  Max
Annual earnings growth per capita  1.54  3.79  -23.92  27.73
Earnings level per capita  11.307 .178 10.839 11.838
Earnings growth (day population)
 a) 1.57 3.93 -  13.40 18.20
Earnings level (day population)
 a) 11.249 .184 10.682 11.865
Spatial lag  83.9 10.7 61.8 116.0
Gini coefficient  .240 .0276 .1899 .3859
Third quintile  19.37 .497 16.37 20.91
P9075 1.208 .027 1.147 1.370
P5010 1.823 .120 1.520 2.463
Percent college grad.  9.00 3.92 3.45 27.84
Population (see also below)  123,051 287,469 2,867 2,260,071
Percent aged 20-29  11.01 1.95 6.03 17.65
Percent aged 30-54  32.56 1.56 27.13 37.36
Farming & mining  5.04 3.58 .65 30.35
Construction 6.80 1.73 3.71 17.80
Manufacturing 21.82 8.84 3.07 55.66
Finance & insurance  8.25 2.79 3.51 23.63
Public sector  33.58 6.27 7.40 48.09
Other sectors  24.51 3.83 16.64 38.39
a) Refers to the case where earnings are attributed to the region where work is situated, 
1990-2005 only.  
 
Percentiles of population size 
1
st   3,224
5
th   3,859
10
th   6,679
25
th   11,842
50
th     38,221
75
th   137,366
90
th   201,352
95
th   408,233
99
th   2,028,513
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Table 2. Cross sectional regressions on average annual growth 1990-2006 and 1994-2006, initial values in 1990 and 1994 as ex-
planatory variables, robust standard errors in parentheses.
 
 
            
Dependent variable:  Average annual growth 1990-2006 
   Average annual growth 1994-2006 
  
  















Gini (standardized)  .216
   .210
  .100
    .390
**   .287
   .309
*   
 (.244)
   (.243)
  (.266)
    (.166)
   (.182)
   (.184)
   
Q3 (standardized) 
  - .147
  - .142
       - .364
***  - .298




       (.125)
  (.135)
    
P9075 (standardized) 
   .249
  .226
       .258
**  .174
   
 
   (.158)
  (.177)
       (.122)
  (.136)
   
P5010 (standardized) 
      .039
       .103
 
 
     (.113)
      (.156)
 
Ln(Income) -  .437
  - 1.339
*  - .655
  - .412
  -. 1 5 3
  - .897
  -. 7 8 7
  - 3.080
***  - 1.762
  - 1.733
**  - .668















Spatial lag   .414
   .412
   .270
   .176
  .140
   .571
  .323
  .256
  - .047
  .392

















   .066
  .086
**  .061
   .059
  .050
   .084
**  -. 0 2 0
  .022
  - .036
   .004
















Fraction aged 20-29  - 1.930
  - .066
    - 2.044
   - .467
  - 4.640
  - .102
    - 2.570


















    2.757
   1.383
  2.409
   9.733
    6.706















Employment proportions  




    3.241
   1.820
  1.183
  2.196
    2.977
















   .535
  - .170
    1.325
   - .742
  6.917
  4.719
    5.187
















  - .034
  - .233
     .076
   - .486
  .780
  1.274
    1.284
















  - 3.487
  - 3.978
    - 5.074
   - 3.727
  1.251
  1.000
     .731
















  - 2.285
  - 3.574
    - 2.525
   - 3.269
  .869
  - 1.351
    - .347

















     4.164
   5.635
  7.350
  31.119
***    15.551






































































***significant at the 1 % level. 
**at the 5 % level. 
*at the 10 % level.
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Table 3. Pooled OLS panel regressions on average annual growth 1994-2006, as measured in three- and four-year intervals, ro-
bust standard errors in parentheses.
 
 
            
Dependent variable:  Average annual growth 1994-2006 (every third year) 
   Average annual growth 1994-2006 (every fourth year) 
  
  















Gini (standardized)   .309
**    .212
  .145
    .196
   .092
   .029
   
 (.147)
   (.212)
  (.169)
    (.152)
   (.148)
   (.149)
   
Q3 (standardized) 
  - .225
**  - .127
       - .353
***  - .332




       (.130)
  (.132)
    
P9075 (standardized) 
    .379
***  .313
**       .323
**  .313
**   
 
    (.135)
  (.156)
       (.146)
  (.153)
   
P5010 (standardized) 
        .197
       .105
 
 
       (.113)
      (.113)
 
Ln(Income) -  1.002
  - 2.680
***  - 1.687
  - 1.263
  -. 9 0 7
  - .839
  - 1.804
  - 3.744
***  - 3.286
***  - 1.766
  - 1.864















Spatial lag   .203
   .405
   .160
  - .017
  -. 1 6 5
   .457
  -. 2 8 8
  - .576
  - .683
  - .589
  - .562
















  - .048
  - .004
  - .040
  - .063
  -. 0 8 0
  - .030
  -. 0 0 7
  .008
  - .010
  - .029
  - .024















                 



































































***significant at the 1 % level. 
**at the 5 % level. 
*at the 10 % level.
 
   38
 
Table 4. Regional fixed effects panel regressions (OLS) on average annual growth 1994-2006, as measured in three- and four-
year intervals, robust standard errors in parentheses.
 
 
            
Dependent variable:  Average annual growth 1994-2006 (every third year) 
   Average annual growth 1994-2006 (every fourth year) 
  
  















Gini (standardized)  - .007 
   - .019 
**  - .008 
    - .009 
   - .010 
  - .014 
   
 (.007)
   (.009)
  (.007)
    (.013)
   (.013)
  (.013)
   
Q3 (standardized) 
  - .004
  - .014
**       .000
  - .002




       (.011)
  (.012)
     
P9075 (standardized) 
    .001
  .004
       .009
  .014
   
 
    (.007)
  (.008)
       (.014)
  (.014)
   
P5010 (standardized) 
        .002
       .006
 
 
       (.006)




























Spatial lag  - .217
  - .227
  - .247
  - .219
  -. 2 2 7
  - .207
  -. 2 5 0
  - .246
  - .251
  - .262
  - .276
















  - .004
  - .004
  - .002
  - .004
  -. 0 0 4
  - .004
  -. 0 0 2
  - .003
  - .002
  - .002
  - .001















                 



































































***significant at the 1 % level. 
**at the 5 % level. 
*at the 10 % level.
 
 
   39
 
Table 5. Region type/family fixed effects panel regressions (OLS) on average annual growth 1994-2006, as measured in three- 
and four-year intervals, robust standard errors in parentheses.
 
 
            
Dependent variable:  Average annual growth 1994-2006 (every third year) 
   Average annual growth 1994-2006 (every fourth year) 
  
  















Gini (standardized)   .335 
**    .262 
  .196 
    .227 
   .137 
  .057 
   
 (.155)
   (.208)
  (.184)
    (.175)
   (.166)
  (.160)
   
Q3 (standardized) 
  - .216
*  - .097
       - .385
**  - .358




       (.162)
  (.157)
     
P9075 (standardized) 
    .394
**  .306
       .396
**  .377
**   
 
    (.162)
  (.191)
       (.175)
  (.174)
   
P5010 (standardized) 
        .222
       .126
 
 
       (.123)
      (.116)
 
Ln(Income) -  1.500
  - 3.162
  - 2.005
  - 1.742
  - 1.307
  - 1.252
  - 2.043
  - 4.098
***  - 3.468
  - 2.081
  - 1.891















Spatial lag   .117
   .347
   .048
  - .144
  -. 3 5 4
   .540
  -. 7 8 9
  - 1.156
   - 1.310
  - 1.237
  - 1.285
















  - .085
  - .033
  - .075
  - .074
  -. 0 9 8
  - .084
  -. 0 1 6
  .020
  - .004
  - .013
  - .022















                 



































































***significant at the 1 % level. 
**at the 5 % level. 
*at the 10 % level.
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Table 6. System GMM estimations.
 
 
       
   
Dependent variable:  Annual growth 1994-2006 (3 yr intervals) 
  
 
       









  (3) (4) (4) (4)
Gini (standardized)   .005
   -. 0 0 0
   .021
   -. 0 0 5
   .009
    .003
   .021
   -. 0 0 6
 
 (.007)
   (.005)
  (.022)
   (.016)
  (.009)
   (.009)
  (.036)
   (.012)
 
Q3 (standardized)  -.001
    .006
    .002
    .012
   
 (.006)
    (.015)
    (.007)
       (.030)




   .016
*  .017
   .007
  .004






   (.009)
  (.014)
   (.009)
  (.010)






























  - .000
  - .001
  -. 0 0 1
  - .002
  -. 0 0 5
  -. 0 0 3
  - .003
  -. 0 0 3
  - .002
  - .003
  -. 0 0 4

















































































***significant at the 1 % level. 
**at the 5 % level. 
*at the 10 % level.
 
System GMM has been performed by using Stata10 and xtabond2 (Roodman, 2006). 
Columns (1): all available lags are used as IV.  Columns (2): IV count is reduced through the use of a collapsed matrix. Columns (3): only the first 
available lag is used as IV.  Columns (4): the strategies of (2) and (3) are combined. In all estimates, Windmeijer (2005) correction to the covariance 
matrix is applied. See footnote 11 for further explanations. 
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Table 6 cont’d. System GMM estimations.
 
 
       
   
Dependent variable:  Annual growth 1994-2006 (4 yr intervals) 
  
 
       









  (3) (4) (4) (4)
Gini (standardized)  .008
   -. 0 0 0
  .010
   .002
  .015
   .012
  - .002
   -. 0 0 7
 
 (.009)
   (.007)
  (.010)
   (.011)
  (.011)
   (.014)
  (.009)
   (.012)
 
Q3 (standardized)  - .003
    .036
*     - .011
    - .034
***   
 (.011)
    (.019)
    (.015)
       (.013)




   .019
  .020
   .013
  .008






   (.018)
  (.016)
   (.020)
  (.017)






























  - .000
  - .003
  -. 0 0 1
  - .003
  -. 0 0 4
  -. 0 0 3
  - .004
  -. 0 0 5
  - .004
  - .000
  -. 0 0 2

















































































***significant at the 1 % level. 
**at the 5 % level. 
*at the 10 % level.
 
System GMM has been performed by using Stata10 and xtabond2 (Roodman, 2006). 
Columns (1): all available lags are used as IV.  Columns (2): IV count is reduced through the use of a collapsed matrix. Columns (3): only the first 
available lag is used as IV.  Columns (4): the strategies of (2) and (3) are combined. In all estimates, Windmeijer (2005) correction to the covariance 









   42
Table 7. Day populations; cross sectional regressions on average annual growth 1990-2005 and 1994-2005, initial values in 1990 and 1994 
as explanatory variables, robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
            
Dependent variable:  Average annual growth 1990-2005 
   Average annual growth 1994-2005 
  
  















Gini (standardized)  - .124
   - .124
  -. 1 2 7
    .323
*   .267
   .272
   
 (.225)
   (.221)
  (.258)
    (.179)
   (.202)
   (.247)
   
Q3 (standardized) 
  - .162
  - .162
       - .228
  - .164




       (.162)
  (.175)
    
P9075 (standardized) 
   - .035
  .005
       .188
  .095
   
 
   (.142)
  (.170)
       (.141)
  (.190)
   
P5010 (standardized) 
     - .050
       .173
 
 
     (.113)
      (.176)
 
Ln(Income) -  1.805
**  - 1.755
***  - 2.001
**  - 1.625
**  - 1.802
**  - 1.755
**  - 1.280
  - 2.721
***  - 1.754
  - 2.025
**  - 1.301















Spatial lag   .187
  - .090
  - .038
   .184
  .181
   .095
  .184
  - .011



















   .182
***  .158
***   .173
***   .171
***  .181
***   .177
***  .053
  .087
   .039
   .078
   .041















Fraction aged 20-29    9.770
  8.963
   10.398
    8.720
  9.749






















  - 7.799
  - 6.517
  - 6.959
  - 7.719
  - 7.756
  - 7.559
   -1 4 . 6 5 5
*   - 8.313
*   - 11.695
   - 10.480
   - 13.560















Employment proportions  
























































  - .421
   .408
   .059
  - .173
   .415






















  - 6.838
  - 6.363
  - 6.753
  - 6.298
  - 6.871
  - 6.853
  .328
  - .861
  .033


















  - 8.579
***  - 7.491
***  - 8.300
***  - 7.930
***  - 8.575
***  - 8.318
***  - 3.700
  - 5.798
**  - 3.428
  - 5.038
*  - 3.253
































































































***significant at the 1 % level. 
**at the 5 % level. 
*at the 10 % level.
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APPENDIX: 
 
Table A.1: Descriptive statistics of seven regional types as defined by the Swedish National Agency 
for Growth Analysis. 1990-2006. 
 


















  38 1 265 1 4 2 4
 
Number of obs. 
  51 136 204 102 85 238 408
 
Annual growth per capita
  1.61 1.39 1.57 1.71 1.43 1.48 1.57
  (3.64) (3.23) (3.44) (3.53) (3.42) (4.70) (3.70)
Log earnings level per capita
  11.516 11.416 11.387 11.396 11.333 11.261 11.203
  (.169) (.122) (.131) (.139) (.139) (.152) (.171)
Growth – day population
a)   1.50 1.24 1.39 1.88 1.23 1.56 1.77
 (3.87) (3.26) (3.52) (3.56) (3.53) (4.71) (4.01)
Log earnings – day population
a) 11.518 11.384 11.348 11.358 11.235 11.194 11.128
 (.184) (.115) (.125) (.153) (.113) (.171) (.199)
Spatial lag  86.6 82.0 90.5 85.2 89.3 83.2 79.8
 (10.1) (9.6) (11.8) (9.8) (11.4) (10.2) (8.6)
Gini coefficient
  .304 .247 .251 .235 .238 .231 .231
  (.035) (.021) (.018) (.016) (.020) (.022) (.026)
Third quintile
  18.39 19.09 19.13 19.25 19.23 19.64 19.60
  (.66) (.30) (.35) (.40) (.34) (.47) (.36)
P9075
  1.283 1.220 1.220 1.202 1.212 1.191 1.198
  (.035) (.018) (.018) (.013) (.018) (.017) (.019)
P5010
  2.051 1.813 1.851 1.771 1.809 1.804 1.812
  (.129) (.083) (.068) (.073) (.108) (.099) (.140)
College graduates (%)
  17.14 12.70 10.49 8.10 9.31 6.66 7.53
  (4.94) (4.23) (3.16) (2.54) (2.77) (2.27) (2.53)
Population
  1,340,812 194,120 164,244  57,836 66,651  21,627  13,762
 (548,077) (89,730) (28,718) (13,956) (12,391) (12,819) (8,924)
Aged 20-29 (%)  13.87 13.28 12.16 10.91 10.86 10.17 9.85
  (.91) (1.68) (1.02) (1.46) (1.22) (1.47) (1.60)
Aged 30-54 (%)
  35.22 33.46 33.12 32.96 33.37 31.82 31.82




  1.42 2.87 2.97 3.21 4.70 4.52 8.10
  (.75) (1.02) (1.15) (1.71) (2.02) (1.50) (4.34)
Construction
  5.86 6.40 6.32 6.57 6.79 6.31 7.63
  (1.06) (1.25) (1.28) (1.61) (1.47) (1.62) (1.93)
Manufacturing
  16.07 17.94 23.95 32.83 20.25 31.78 14.52
  (3.67) (4.46) (3.42) (7.09) (4.31) (5.45) (5.81)
Finance & insurance
  15.00 10.23 9.17 7.30 8.75 6.24 7.60
  (3.78) (1.79) (1.65) (2.01) (1.85) (1.30) (2.44)
Public sector
  30.37 36.47 33.13 28.67 34.72 30.75 35.88
  (4.10) (5.47) (4.77) (5.39) (5.09) (5.37) (6.71)
Other sectors
  31.28 26.08 24.46 21.43 24.80 20.40 26.28
 (1.74) (1.62) (2.43) (2.23) (2.20) (2.11) (3.62)
a) Refers to the case where earnings are attributed to the region where work is situated.  
b) The sum of the employment shares sum to one in each region. 
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Table A.2. Regressions on inequality measures (standardized values). 
 
  
         
  Observations in 1990 and 2006. 
   
    
   
 
  
   
    
   
 




   P9075
  P9075
  P5010 












  - .247
***   - 2.251
    - 1.342




   (1.977)
    (.949)
   (2.005)
 
Spatial lag  .047 
  .064
*  - 4.102
***  - 3.947
***  2.455
**  2.547
**  - .616












  .009 
**  .011
***  - .323















Fraction aged 20-29  .689 
  1.127
***  - 2.838
   1.154
  - 9.773














  - 1.061 
***  - .144
  22.127
**  30.489
***  - 23.603
***  - 18.618
**  - 11.908
  25.705
** 









Employment proportions  
            
Farming & mining
  - .196 
  - .139
  - 1.406
  - .892
  - 8.112
*  - 7.805
*  - 6.297
  - 3.985
 










   .098 
  - .032
  6.575
  5.391
  - 1.470














  - .125 
  - .045
  1.334
  2.068
  - 6.951
**  - 6.513
**  - 3.154
  .150
 










  - .099 
   .160
  - 6.004
  - 3.642
  - 2.292
   - .884
  - 5.824
  4.801
 










  - .400 
***  - .413
***  8.841
***  8.721
***  - 15.374
***  - 15.445
***  - 9.884
**  - 10.425
** 













**   13.506

































***significant at the 1 % level. 
**at the 5 % level. 
*at the 10 % level.
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Table A.3. Regressions on regional level of income and growth. 
 
  
         
  Observations in 1990 and 2006. 
  Panel data 1990-2006, every 4 years.
 
      
   
   
   
   
   
 
Dependent variable:  Ln(Income)
 Ln(Income) Growth 
  Growth
  Ln(Income) Growth 
  Growth 











Gini    
  - .107
**     - .031
**      
  
  (.045)
    (.013)
    
Ln(Income)  
    - 1.136
      - 2.148
** 
  
    (.731)
      (.941)
 




  - .002







    (.778)
 
College graduates






***  - .004
  .037
 









Fraction aged 20-29  1.417 
  1.654
  - 2.227
  - .213
  - 3.389
***      2.473
 





    (7.747)
 
Fraction aged 30-54
  3.298 
***  2.270
*  - 2.604
  1.615
   5.236
***      4.051
 





    (7.442)
 
Employment proportions  
           
Farming & mining
   .472 
  - .035
  1.524
  1.783
  - .362
    .433
 





    (3.629)
 
Construction
  - .587 
  - 1.156
  - .382
  - .979
  - 3.169
***     1.278
 





    (6.402)
 
Manufacturing
   .173 
  - .214
  - .957
  - .587
   .124
    - .428
 





    (1.876)
 
Finance & insurance
   .217 
  - .404
  - 5.199
  - 4.007
   .426
    1.215
 





    (4.294)
 
Public sector
  - .641 
  - 1.339
**  - 3.670
*  - 3.731
*  - .612
*     - 3.533
 









***  - 1.715
*   8.407
  10.135
***  .153









































***significant at the 1 % level. 
**at the 5 % level. 
*at the 10 % level.

















              
Table A.4. Cross sectional regressions on average annual growth, initial values in 1990 and 1994 as respective explanatory variables, 
robust standard errors in parentheses 
              



























            



























            
Q3 (standardized)  - .211
  - .187
*  - .273
**  -. 2 4 2
*  - .257
*  - .330
  - .157
   .002
  - .278
**  -. 2 0 9
*  -. 2 9 4
















            


























Q3 (standardized)  - .204
  - .181
*  - .267
**  -. 2 3 7
*  - .250
*  - .319
  - .151
   .004
  - .231
*  -. 1 6 7
  -. 2 4 7
















            



























            





















































            



























***significant at the 1 % level. 
**at the 5 % level. 
*at the 10 % level.
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Table A.5. Pooled OLS panel regressions on average annual growth, interval lengths of between three and six years with varying evaluation 




                
  Every third year
      Every fourth year 
       
 
                





























                




  -. 0 8 0
  .216
*  .114
  - .064
  .125
  .094
  - .163


















             
Q3 (standardized)  - .181
*  - .164
  - .095
  - .187
*  -. 0 3 7
  - .291
***  - .288
**  - .016
  - .209
*  - .205
**   .009
  - .098

















             




  -. 1 0 4
  .090
  .024
  - .093
  .026
  .001
  - .210
  .058
















Q3 (standardized)  - .132
  - .149
  - .082
  - .159
  -. 0 6 1
  - .267
***  - .282
**  - .050
  - .201
  - .204
  - .069
  - .084

















             





























             
Gini (standardized)  .070
  .026
  - .050
  .066
  -. 1 7 1
  .048
  - .036
  - .127
  .006
  - .011
  - .265
   .038













































             





























***significant at the 1 % level. 
**at the 5 % level. 
*at the 10 % level.
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Table A.5 cont’d. Pooled OLS panel regressions on average annual growth, interval lengths of between three and six years with vary-
ing evaluation periods, robust standard errors in parentheses. 
              
  Every fifth year        Every sixth year       
              























            




  -. 2 1 6
   .177
  -. 0 2 0
  .119















            
Q3 (standardized)   .073
  - .149
  - .216
  -. 1 5 3
  .093
   -. 1 5 2
  - .088
  - .203
  .001














            
Gini (standardized)  - .207
  - .020
  .055
  .012
  -. 2 0 0
   .131
  -. 0 8 0
  - .046














Q3 (standardized)   .002
  - .154
  - .204
  -. 1 4 9
  .020
   -. 1 1 7
  -. 1 2 0
  - .222
  -. 0 3 3














            























            
Gini (standardized)  - .356
**  - .062
  - .027
  .036
  -. 3 9 2
*   .045
  -. 0 9 9
  - .105














P9075 (standardized)  .254






















            























***significant at the 1 % level. 
**at the 5 % level. 
*at the 10 % level.
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Table A.6. Regional fixed effects panel regressions on average annual growth, interval lengths of between three and six years with varying 




                
  Every third year
      Every fourth year 
       
 
                





























                
Gini (standardized)  - .002
   .002
   .004
  .002
  .003
   .003
  .003
   .006
  - .002
   .002
  - .003


















             
Q3 (standardized)  - .005
  - .006
  - .007
  - .008
**  -. 0 1 0
**  - .005
  - .008
  - .008
  - .001
  - .007
  - .008
   .003

















             
Gini (standardized)  - .012
  - .002
  - .000
  - .005
  -. 0 0 6
  - .001
  - .002
  - .003
  - .002
  - .013
  - .010

















Q3 (standardized)  - .011
*  - .006
  - .007
  - .010
**  -. 0 1 2
**  - .005
  - .009
  - .009
  - .000
  - .013
**  - .011
  - .012

















             





























             
Gini (standardized)  - .004
  - .000
  - .000
  .000
  .003
   .000
  - .004
   .003
  - .004
  - .000
  - .007





















  -. 0 0 0
   .006
  .011






















             
P5010 (standardized)  .005
  - .001
  - .000
  - .002
  -. 0 1 0
*   .001
  .005
  - .003
  .005
  - .003
  - .007


















***significant at the 1 % level. 
**at the 5 % level. 
*at the 10 % level.
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Table A.7. Region type fixed effects panel regressions on average annual growth, interval lengths of between three and six years with vary-
ing evaluation periods, robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
                
  Every third year
      Every fourth year 
       
 
                





























                
Gini (standardized)   .229
   .139
   .209
  - .055
  .089
   .205
  .139
   .130
  - .014
  - .157
   .120


















             
Q3 (standardized)  - .171
  - .166
  - .200
*  - .026
  -. 0 9 1
  - .327
***  - .285
**  - .218
**  - .040
  - .021
  - .083
  - .254

















             
Gini (standardized)  .153
  .087
  .151





  - .047



















Q3 (standardized)  - .103
  - .144
  - .163
  - .041
  -. 0 7 8
  - .308
***  - .272
**  - .206
*  - .058
  - .051
  - .061
  - .236

















             





























             
Gini (standardized)   .109
   .055
   .101
  - .136
  -. 0 2 5
   .045
  - .013
   .014
  - .080
















































             





























***significant at the 1 % level. 
**at the 5 % level. 
*at the 10 % level.
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Table A.7 cont’d. Region type fixed effects panel regressions on average annual growth, interval lengths of between three and six 
years with varying evaluation periods, robust standard errors in parentheses. 
              
  Every fifth year        Every sixth year       
              























            
Gini (standardized)   - .221
   .047
   - .294
  .108
  .173
   .188
  .010
















            
Q3 (standardized)  - .082
  - .143
   .103
*  -. 2 2 2
  -. 2 0 8
   -. 1 6 1
  -. 0 9 7
  - .004
  -. 1 2 3














            
Gini (standardized)  - .216
  -.004
  - .297
  .058
  .053
   .144
  -. 0 5 1
  - .063
  .208













Q3 (standardized)  - .007
  - .143
  - .004
  -. 2 1 3
  -. 1 8 9
*   -. 1 2 5
  -. 1 1 8
  - .018
  -. 0 4 4














            























            
Gini (standardized)   - .351
*  - .043
   - .424
**  -. 0 1 0
  .086
   .049
  -. 0 8 8
  - .175
  .192




































            























***significant at the 1 % level. 
**at the 5 % level. 
*at the 10 % level.
 
              
              
 
 
 